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HOLT v. COLLEGE OF OSTEOPATHIO
PHYSICIANS & SUBGEONS

[L. A. No. 26995.

In Bank.

[61 C.2d

Aug. 31, 1964.]

J .. FRANK HOLT et a1., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.
COLLEGE OF OSTEOPATHIC PHYSICIANS AND
SURGEONS' et al, Defendants and Respondents.
[1] Oha.ritiea--:Aetions-Parties.-Nothing in Corp. Code, 1§9505,
10207, providing that if there is a failure to comply with a
charitable trust the Attorney General shall institute, in the
name of the state, the proceedings necessary to correct the
noncompliance or departure, or in th-e Uniform Supervision
of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act (Gov. Code, §§ 1258012595) precludes trustees from bringing an action to enforce
'
the trust.
[2] Id.-Actions-Parties.-Corp. Code, I§ 9505, 10207, authorizing the Attorney General to bring an action to enforce a
charitable trust, and the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for
Charitable Purposes Act (Gov. Code, §§12580-12595) were
enacted in recognition of the problem of providing adequate
supervision and enforcement of charitable trusts.
[8] Id.-Actions-With Respect to Oharitable 'l'rusts.-In deternlining that legal action by his office against a charitable
trust was not warranted because the changes in the operation
of the charitable institution would not be dt'trimental to the
public interest, the Attorney General used an incorrect test;
a trust is not fulfilled merely by applying the assets in the
public interest, but by using them only for the purposes for
which they were received in trust.
[4] Id.-Actions-Parties.-The Attorney General has primary
responsibility for the enforcement of charitable trusts, but
the need for adequate enforcement is not wholly fulfilled by
the authority given him; there is no rule or policy against
supplementing his power of enforcement by allowing other
responsible individuals, such as trustees of a charitable trust,
to sue in behalf of the charity.
[6] Id.-Aetions-Parties.-Permitting suits to enforce a charitable trust by the charitable trustees. does not usurp the
Attorne:y\ General's responsibility, since he would be a necessary party to such litigation and would represent the public
interest.
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Charities, § 39; Am.Jur.2d, Charities, § 118
et seq.
Melt. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4-6, 9] Charities, § 40; [3, 7, 8]
Charities, § 39(2).
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[6] Id.-Actions-l"arties.-Minority trustees of • charitable corporation have the capacity to bring an action in behalf of the
corporation against the majority trustees to enjoin any
threatened breach of trust. (Disapproving George Pepperdine
Foundation v. Pepperdine, 126 Cal.App.2d 154 [271 P.2d 600]
to the extent that it is contrary to this opinion.)
[7] Id.-Actions-With ltespect to Oharitable Trusts.-A cause of
action for enjoining a threatened breach of a charitable trust
was stated by a complaint alleging that the charitable purpose
of the trust was primarily to conduct a college of osteopathy
for the training of osteopathic physicians and surgeons and
for the general furtherance of the profession of osteopathy,
that there was a distinction between osteopathic and allopathic
medicine, and that it was proposed to change the curriculum
of the college or to take other steps to gain accreditation as an
allopathic medical college, and to train allopathic physicians
and surgeons.
[8] Id.-Actions-With Respect to Oharitable Trusts.-A cause
of action for declaratory relief was stated by a complaint
alleging that a controversy existed between minority trustees
of a charitable trust and the majority trustees over their rights
and duties as trustees of the charitable corporation; the
minority trustees were entitled to a judicial declaration of
the charitable purposes of the trust and whether certain conduct by the trustees would be contrary to these purposes and
therefore a breach of trust.
[9] Id.-Actions-Parties. - Where the minority trustees of a
charitable corporation engaged in operating a college of osteopathy for the training of osteopathic physicians and. surgeons
sought to enjoin performance by the college of a contract
between the college and the California Osteopathic Association, the effect of a decree would be to enjoin the association
as well as the college and the association was thus an indispensable party.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Leon T. David, Judge. Reversed.
Action to enjoin breach of a charitable trust and for declaratory relief with regard to operation of a charitable corporation.
Judgment of dismissal after demurrer to complaint was sustained without leave to amend,lreversed.
Mitcllell, Silberberg & Knupp, Arthur Groman and Howard
S. Smith for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
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Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Carl Boronkay, Deputy
Attorney General, Belcher, Benzie &; Biegenzahn, Belcher,
Benzie & Fargo, George M. Benzie and Seth M. B ufstedler
for Defendants and Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered after the sustaining of a demurrer to their
complaint without leave to amend in an action to enjoin the
breach of a charitable trust and for declaratory relief.
Plaintiffs are three trustees of defendant College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons (hereinafter COPS), a California charitable corporation. The other defendants are the
23 remaining trustees on the COPS board of trustees and
the Attorney General. The complaint alleges in substance
that COPS holds assets in excess of $1,500,000 in trust for
charitable purposes, and that defendant trustees have acted
contrary to these purposes and threaten other such acts. By
their first cause of action plaintiffs seek to enjoin these acts,
and by their second cause of action they seek a declaration
of their and defendants' rights and duties with regard to the
operation of COPS.
The Attorney General filed an answer to the complaint
denying for want of information and belief the allegations
that defendant trustees were diverting the assets of COPS
from its charitable purposes. As an affirmative defense the
Attorney General stated that "The matter,of proposed changes
in the operation of said College was reviewed by the Attorney
General to determine whether such changes would constitute
a violation of a charitable trust warranting institution of a
suit by this office to remedy the situation. It has been concluded that the changes to be made in the· operation of said
College would not be detrimental to the public interest and
do not warrant legal action by this office to prevent such
changes. " The Attorney General also stated that he had
not granted "relator status" to plaintiffs and had not consented to' their bringing this action. Defendant trustees
demurred to the complaint and the trial court sustained the
demurrer on the grounds tbat plaintiffs have no capacity to
bring this action and that the c.omplaint does not state facts
showing a threatened breach of a charitable trust.
The first issue is whether plaintiffs, as minority trustees
of a charitable corporation, can sue the majority trnstees to
enjoin their allegedly wrongful diversion of corporate assets

)
Aug. 1964]

HOLT tI. COLLEGE OF OSTEOPATHIC
PHYSICUNS & SURGEONS

753

till C.2d 'SO; to CaUtptr. 10M. 8lI4 P.2d 1321

)

in breach of a trust for charitable purposes. Defendants contend that only the Attorney General can bring such an action.
The prevailing view of other jurisdictions is that the Attorney General does not have exclusive power to enforce a
charitable trust and that a trustee or other person having
a sufficient special interest may also bring an action for this
purpose.1 This position is adopted by the American Law
Institute (Rest. 2d Trusts, § 391) and is supported by many
legal scholars. (Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar:
An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 433, 443449; 4 Scott, Trusts (2d ed.) § 391; 4 Pomeroy, Equity (5th
ed.) 287, n. 13; see also Note 62 A.L.R. 881; 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (7th ed.) 2918-2919.)
In accord with the majority view, this court has stated
that ". . . the only person who can object to the disposition
of the trust property is one having some definite interest in
the property-he must be a trustee, or a cestui, or have some
reversionary interest in the trust property." (O'Hara v.
Orand Lodge I.O.O.T., 213 Cal. 131, 140 [2 P.2d 21] ; see also
People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129. 136 [48 P. 270, 35 L.R.A.
269] ; Pratt v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 15 CalApp.2d
630, 640-641 [59 P.2d 862] ; cf. St. James Church v. Superior
Court, 135 CalApp.2d 352, 360 {287 P.2d 387].}
[1] Defendants invoke Corporations Code sections 9505
and 10207 for the proposition that only the Attorney General
can bring an action for the enforcement of a charitable
trust administered by either a nonprofit or charitable· cor1 (D'Uffee v. JOfleB, 208 Ga. 639 [68 B.E.2d 699, 703); JenkintJ v. Berry,
119 Ky. 850 [88 B.W. 594, 597); Sister Elizabeth Kenny Foundation v.
NafionGl FoundatiOfl, 267 Minn. 852 [126 N.W.2d 640, 646); Dickey
v. Volker, 821 Mo. 285 [11 B.W.2d 278, 281, 62 A.L.R. 858]; Bouhegan
Nat. Bonk v. KenisOfl, 92 N.H. 117 [26 A.2d 26, SO]; DiCrisfofaro v.
La'Urel Gr01Je Memorial Park, 48 N.J. Buper. 244 [128 A.2d 281, 284];
TrlUJtee. of Bailor.' Sn'Ug Harbor v. Carmody, 158 App.Div. 738 [144
N.Y.S. 24,87], affd. 211 N.Y. 286 [105 N.E. 543, 546]; Shields v. Harris,
190 N.C. 520 [180 B.E. 189, 192]; ~gan v. Uflited State8 Nat. Bank, 227
Ore. 619 [868 P.2d 765, 769); Wiegand v. Barnes F01lndationtJ, 874 Pa.
149 [97 A.2d.81, 82·83] ; Cle1!enger v. Rio Farms (Tex.Civ.App.) 204 B.W.
3d 40, 45·46: CZar1e v. Oli1!er, 91 Va. 421 [22 B.E. 175, 176]; Nash v.
Morley. 49 Eng. Reprint 545, 547-548; see also Thurlow v. Berry, 247 Ala.
631 [25 So.2d 726, 733]; CannOfliv. StephentJ, 18 Del. Ch. 276 [159 A. 234,
286·287]; HoZilen Hospital Corp. v. SO'Uthern. Ill. Hospital Corp., 22 m.
2d 150 [174 N.E.2d 793, 796); Gilbert v. MoLeod Iflfirmary, 219 B.C.
174 [64 B.E.2d 524, 528, 24 A.L.R.2d 60]; Bellows Free .Aoademy v.
Sowle., 76 Vt. 412 [57 A. 996, 999].)
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poration. These sections provide that if there is a failure
to comply with a charitable trust". • • the Attorney General
shall institute, in the name of the State, the proceedings
necessary to correct the noncompliance or departure." Nothing
in these sections suggests that. trustees are precluded from
bringing an action to enforce the trust. The Uniform Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes Act (Gov. Code,
§§ 12580-12595) similarly authorizes the Attorney General to
supervise charitable trusts, and likewise fails to preclude suits
by trustees.
ra] The foregoing statutes were enacted in recognition of
the problem of providing. adequate supervision and enforcement of charitable trusts.' Beneficiaries of a charitable trust,
unlike beneficiaries of a private trust, are ordinarily indefinite and therefore unable to enforce the trust in their own
behalf. (E.g., People v. Oogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 136-137 [45
P. 270, 35 L.R.A. 269] ; Pratt v. Security Trust 4: Sav. Bank,
15 Cal.App.2d 630, 639-641 [59 P.2d 862].) Since there
is usually no one willing to assume the burdens of a legal
action, or who could properly represent the interests of the
trust or the public, the Attorney General has been empowered
to oversee charities as the representative of the public, a
practice having 'its origin in the early common law. (See
generally Scott, supra, § 391, pp. 2753.2756.)
In addition to the general public interest, however, there
is the interest of donors who have directed that their contributions be used for certain charitable purposes. Although
the public in general may benefit from any number of charitable purposes, charitable contributions must be used only
for the purposes for which they were received in trust.
(O'Hara v. Grand Lodge I.O.G.T., supra, 213 Cal. at pp. 140141; Pacific Home v. Oounty of Los Angeles, 41 Ca1.2d 844,
854 [264 P.2d 539]; see also Estate of Faulkner, 128 Cal.
App.2d 575, 578 [275 P.2d 818].) Moreover, part of the
problem of enforcement is to bring to light conduct detrimental to a charitable trust so that remedial action may be

•

'This problem has been extensively diaeussed in recent years. (Bee
Karst, The Efficiency of the ChGritable Dollar: .Af/, Unfulfilled 8'Gte
Re8p01l8ibiZity, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 433; Bogert, Prop08ed LegislG'ioft Rego.rd.
iflg 8'0.16 8upertlisiofl. of ChGritie8, 52 Yieh.L.Rev. 633; Bogert, Recen.
Developtllt'nt8 BegGrdiflg the LGw of C1tGrito.ble Donations and C1tarito.bZe
Trust8, 21 U .Chi.L.Rev. 118; Note, 8tG'e Bvper1lision of the .Admiflis·
tro.tioft 0/ Charitable Trud8, 47 Colum.L.Rcv. 659; Note, The ChoritGbZe
'. Corporo.tiOft, 64 Han.L.Rev. 1168.)

)
)'
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taken. The Attorney General may not be in a position to
become aware of wrongful conduct or to be sufficiently familiar
with the situation to appreciate its impact, and the various
responsibilities of his office may also tend to make it burdensome for him to institute legal actions except in situations
of serious public detriment. (See Karst, supra,73 Harv.L.Rev.
at pp. 478-479; Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State
Supervision of Charit'ies, 52 Mich.L.Rev. 633, 634-636; Scott,
supra, § 391, pp. 2754-2756.)
The present case illustrates these difficulties. [8] The pleading rued by the Attorney General stated that he had no
information or helief as to the plaintiffs' allegations that
trust assets were being diverted from their charitable purpose. Yet the pleading also stated that the Attorney General
determined tl1at legal action by his office was not warranted
because the changes in the operation of COPS "would not
be detrimental to the public interest. . . ." The test applied
by the Attorney General in deciding not to take legal action
is clearly incorrect, for the assets of COPS as a charitable
institution can be used only for the purposes for which they
were received in trust. The trust is not fulfilled merely by
applying the assets in the public interest.'
[4] Although the Attorney General has primary responsibility for the enforcement of charitable trusts, the need for
adequate enforcement is not wholly fulfilled by the authority
given him. The protection of charities from harassing litigation does not require that only the Attorney General be
permitted to bring legal actions in their behalf. This consideration " .•• is quite inapplicable to enforcement by the
fiduciaries who are both few in number and charged with the
duty of managing the charity's affairs." (Karst, supra, 73
Barv.L.Rev. at pp. 444-445.) There is no rule or policy
against supplementing the Attorney General's power of
enforcement by allowing other responsible individuals to sue
in behalf of the charity.4 The administration of chari.table
'We are Dot presented with the applieabllity of the Q-Pl'6ll doctrine,
which permits change of charitable purposes under lome circumstances.
(Bee, e.g., Estate of Loring, 29 Ca1.2d 423, 436 [175 P.2d 524]; O'Hara
v. Grand Lodge I.O.G.T., ,upra, 213 Cal. at pp. 140·141.)
4Defendant trustees' reference to the safeguards afforded in the area
of private corporations (Corp. Code, 1834) is inapplicable, since trust.ees
as fiduciaries have a special interest wholly unlike that of a private corporate shareholder. We do Dot reach the question whether minority
directors of a private corporation can bring an action in· behalf of the

)
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trusts stands only to benefit if in addition to the Attorney
General other suitable means of enforcement are available.
"The charity's own representative has at least as much interest
in preserving the charitable funds as does the Attorney General who represents the general public. The cotrustee is also
in the best position to learn about breaches of trust and to
bring the relevant facts to a court's attention." (Karst, supra,
73 Harv.L.Rev. at p. 444.) [6] Moreover, permitting suits
by trustees does not usurp the responsibility of the Attorney
General, since he would bea necessary party to such litigation
and would represent the public interest. (See In re Los
Angeles County Pioneer Society, 40 Ca1.2d 852, 861 [257
P.2d 1].)
Defendant trustees urge that a distinction should be made
between trustees of a charitable trust and the governing board
of a charitable corporation. They apparently concede that a
minority trustee of a charitable trust has the capacity to sue,
but contend that members of a governing board of a charitable
corporation are not truly trustees· and that a diiferentrule
applies to them. The Attorney General takes the position
that he is the only one empowered to bring suit in either
situation. Corporations Code section 10205 states that the
powers of a charitable corporation shall be vested in a "board
of trustees." Defendant trustees contend, however, that this
title does not disclose their true status, that it is the corporation as a legal entity that is properly designated the trustee
of the assets held in trust for charitable purposes, and that
the members of the board are merely employeeS of the corporate trustee.
It is true that trustees of a charitable corporation do not
have all the attributes of a trustee of a charitable trust. They
do not hold legal title to corporate property (see Corp. Code,
§ 10206, subd. (d» and they are not individually liable for
corporate liabilities (Corp. Code, § 9504) .. The individual
trustees in either case, however, are the ones solely responsible
for administering the trust assets (Corp. Code, § 10205), and
in both eases they are fiduciaries· in performing their trust
duties. (St."James Church v. Sflperior Court, 135 Cal.App.2d
352, 361 [287 P.2d 387].) Rules governingcbaritable trusts
ordinarily apply to charitable corporations. (Karst, supra,
1

eorporation. (Of. S/lalMtd I"". Corp. T. IffnprVtt, 1M., 190 Oal.A.pp.Sa
805 [12 Cal.Rptr. 158].) The aUfereneee between private and charitable
eorporationa make the consideration of wch an analol7 value1eaa.

)
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73 Harv.L.Rev. at pp. 435-436; Rest.2d Trusts, supra, § 348,
p. 212; Scott, supra, § 348.1, p. 2559; Comment, Trusts-Gifts
to Charitable Corporations, 26 So.Cal.L.Rev. 80, 85.) There
is no sound reason why minority directors or "trustees" of a
cllaritable corporation cannot maintain an action against
majority trustees when minority trustees of a charitable trust
are so empowered.
The rules governing private trusts also support plaintiffs '
position with respect to the enforcement of a charitable trust.
It is settled that one trustee of a private trust may sue a cotrustee to enjoin conduct by him that violates the trust, notwithstanding the right of the beneficiaries to bring an action
in their own behalf. (E.g., Estate of Hensel, 144 Ca1.App.2d
429, 438 [301 P.2d 105]; Stanton v. Preis, 138 Cal.App.2d
104, 106 [291 P.2d 118) ; Rest. 2d Trusts, supra, § 200, comment e.) It follows a !m·tioN that a charitable trust should be
enforceable by one or more of its trustees, since its indefinite
class of beneficiaries is ordinarily not able to protect its own
interest by legal action. 6
[6] Plaintiff trustees therefore have the capacity to bring
an action in behalf of COPS against the majority trustees to
enjoin any breach of trust that is threatened. To the extent
it is contrary to this opinion, George Pepperdine Foundation
v. Pepperdine, 126 Ca1.App.2d 154 [271 P.2d600), is disapproved.
The question remains whether the complaint states a cause
of action. A summary of the complaint follows. The articles
of incorporation of COPS state its charitable purposes to be:
"To establish, maintain, carryon and conduct an osteopathic medical and surgical college, in which all branches of
learning, and instruction which now pertain or which may in
the future pertain to the science and art of health maintenance; prevention, relief and recovery from disease, as well
as any or all academic subjects desirable or necessary as a
foundation for the teaching of such branches." [sic)
Osteopathic medicine, unlike allopathic medicine, placE'S
68t. Jo.mea Church v. Superior Court, npra, 135 Cal.A.pp.2d 352, 360,
relied on this~ rule in upholding an action brought by a majority of
trustees of a charitable religious corporation against one of the trustees
to enjoin his breach of trust. Tile, C'ourt quoted section 200, comment c,
of the Restatement Second of Trusts, 3'Upro., for the rule that "If there
are several trustees, one or more of them can maintain a suit against
another to compel him to perform his duti('s under the trust, or to enjoin
him from ~ommitting a breach of trust. • • ."

)
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special emphasis on the "functions and importance of the
dysfunctions of the musculoskeletal system of the human
body," on the "intimate interrelationship and natural curative resources of the human body viewed as a whole," and on
the "value of manipulative therapy for conditions and ailments of the human body." Students in an osteopathic school
receive a special and unique education and training in the
principles of osteopathic medicine not taught at medical
schools teaching the allopathic theory of medicine. Physicians
trained at osteopathic schools are known as osteopathic physicians and surgeons, or as osteopaths, and constitute a separate
and distinct profession practicing the diagnosis and treatment
of all human ailments. An osteopath receives an unlimited
physician's and surgeon's license that grants him rights and
privileges identical with those granted by the license issued
to a graduate of an allopathic medical school. Osteopathy is
a growing profession in the United States and is generally
accepted and recognized as a distinct and separate school and
theory of medicine.
At all times since its incorporation in 1914 until about May
24, 1961, COPS continuously conducted an osteopathic medical and surgical college that trained young men and women
in osteopathic medicine. Other activities of COPS include
staffing, teaching, and assisting in the operation of the Los
Angeles Osteopathic Hospital, a division of the Los Angeles
County Hospital; carrying on research in osteopathic medicine; conducting a general clinic providing osteopathic medical
and surgical care; and operating a postgraduate school in
ost.eopathic medicine and surgery. During this period the
trustees of COPS have held out to the public and members of
the osteopathic profession that COPS was an osteopathic
medical college dedicated to providing training in osteopathic
medicine. On the basis of such representations, COPS has
solicited and received donations for use in teaching, research,
and the general promotion of osteopathy. COPS also has
actively solicited and received scholarship funds and research
g-rants from the American Osteopathic Associations, a national or~anization dedicated to the furtherance of osteopathic
medicine and surgery in the United States.
Plaintiffs allege that defendant trustees threaten to divert
the assets of COPS to purposes other than those for ,vhich
it was organized and for which COPS }18S in tlle past solicited
and received funds in trust. The particular acts complained of
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are (1) on May 24, 1961, defcndant trustees resolved that
COPS shall perform certain acts contemplated in an agreement between the California Medical Association and the
California Osteopathic Association, including changing the
name of COPS so that neither the ,vord "osteopathic" or any
similar word shall be used, and using its best efforts to obtain
approval by the Council on Medical Education and Hospi"tals
of the American Medical Association and to obtain membership in the Association of American Medical Colleges; (2) on
June 5, 1961, defendant trustees resolved to apply for membership for COPS in the Association of American Medical
Colleges, and to apply for approval of COPS by the Council
on Medical Education and Hospitals of the American Medical
Association; (3) COPS has, on the direction of defendant
trustees, applied to the Association of American Medical Colleges for approval as an allopathic medical school, and has
applied to the Council on Medical Education and Hospitals
of the American Medical Association to become an approved
allopathic medical school; (4) on June 5, 1961, defendant
trustees resolved to amend the articles of incorporation of
COPS to change its name to "California College of Medicine, "
and COPS has since filed an amendment with the Secretary of
State so changing its name; (5) on November 8, 1961, defendant trustees approved an agreement between COPS and
the California Osteopathic Association in which COPS agreed
to perform various of the acts already recited and also "to
assist in the removal of the distinction among any persons
practicing medicine in the State of California holding an
unlimited Physician and Surgeon's certificate."
Plaintiffs contend that the foregoing acts have the purpose
and effect of abandoning and repUdiating the charitable purpose of COPS to conduct an osteopathic medical and surgical
college and to convert COPS into a school teaching nonosteopathic medicine and surgery according to the allopathic school
of. medicine.
[7] We have concluded that the complaint states a cause
of action for Fnjoining a threatened breach of a charitable
trust. If the allegations of the complaint are true, the charitable purpose of COPS is primarily to conduct a college of
osteopathy for the training o'f osteopathic physicians and
surgeons and for the general furtherance of the profession of
osteopathy. The complaint sufficiently a)]eges a distinction
betwt'en osteopathic and allopathic medicine. Consequently,
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the change of COPS' curriculum or the taking of other steps I,~
for the purpose of gaining accreditation as an allopathit'~
medical college, and the training of allopathic physicians and l.·-.·
surgeons, are sufficiently alleged to be acts not within the .. ~
purpose of conducting an osteopathic college.
<1
Defendant trustees contend that the differences between the .•~
two branches of medicine are insignificant and that the re-l
moval of any di~tinction between these branches. would not ,~
change the teachmg of osteopathy from that preVIously prac- .i~
ticed at COPS. These contentions, however, do not go to the .~
sufficiency of the complaint, but only raise issues of the truth .•~
of the allegations of the complaint.
.'~
Defendant trustees also point out that the articles of COP~ :~
provide that it shall establish a college ' 'in which shall ~.,
taught all branches of learning, and instruction which now
pertain or which may in the future pertain to the science and J
art of health maintenance. . • ." This provision justifies the~'~
teaching of subjects in allopathic medicine at COPS, and in :i
fact the complaint alleges that COPS provides ,. training and "
education equal in scope and subject matter in all respects "
to the training received by students in medical schools teaching the allopathic school and theory of medicine." The
purpose of COPS nevertheless is to conduct an osteopathic
college, and, if the allegations of the complaint are true, the
teaching of allopathic medicine is proper only insofar as is •
useful in the training of osteopaths. It is alleged that osteopathic schools place special emphasis on osteopathic theories
and practices not emphasized in schools of allopathic medicine.
According to the complaint, the training of osteopaths de- .;
pends on the emphasis given to various subjects, even though '
courses maybe given in allopathic medicine. Whether the
teaching of allopathic medicine as threatened by defendant
trustees will change the teaching emphasis at COPS contrary
to the charitable purpose of conducting an osteopathic college
presents a question of fact that cannot be decided on demurrer.
[8] The complaint also states a cause of action for declaratory relief. Plaintiffs have alleged that a controversy exists
between them and defendant trustees over their rights and
duties as trustees of COPS. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial
declaration of the char~table purposes of the COPS trust and
whether certain conduct by COPS trustees would be contrary
to these purposes and therefore a breach of trust.
[9] The trial court correctly held that the California
'.osteopathic Association (hereinafter COA) is an indispen-

l
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aable party to this action. Since plaintiffs seek to enjoin the
performance by COPS of a contract between COPS and COA,
·.the effect of a decree in favor of plaintiffs would be to enjoin
COA as well as COPS. COA is therefore an indispensable
party. (Miracle Adhesives Corp. v. Peninsula Tile Contractors
Assn., 157 Ca1.App.2d 591, 593-594: {321 P.2d 4:82] ; Code Civ.
Proc., § 389.) Plaintiffs should be given leave to amend to
join COA as a party defendant.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., Tobriner,
curred.

-)

J.~andPeek,

J., con-

MoCOMB, J.-I dissent. In my. opinion, this is the sole
guestion necessary to determine: Did the three minority
trustees have the capacity to sue the corporation without the
consent of the Attorney General'
No. Only the Attorney General may bring an action to
correct noncompliance with a trust assumed by a charitable
corporation.
The affairs of either a private corporation or a charitable
corporation are managed by a majority of the board of directors or board of trustees of the corporation (Corp. Code,
§§ 800, 10205),1 and the Corporations Code contains no provision to permit a minority of the directors or trustees,
as such, to question action taken by the majority.2
ISection 800 of the Corporations Code provides: "Subject to limitations of the articles and of this division as to action wljjeh shall be
authorized or approved by the shareholders, an corporate powers shall
be aereised by or under authority of, aDd the business aDd affairs of
every corporation shall be eontrolled by, a board of not less thaD three
directors. ' ,
Section 10205 of the Corporations Code provides~ "Subject to the
provisions of the articles of incorporation [of a charitable corporation],
the aercise of the powers of the corporation, with the rigbt to delegate
to officers and agents the performance of duties and tlte exercise of powers, shall be vested in a board of trustees •• ,
Under section 10201 of the Corporations Code, a charitable corporation is require«\ to have not 1e88 than 9, Dor more than 25, trustees.
2Unlike California, New York specifically permits a director or oflicer
of a corporation, as sueh, to institute and maintain a suit questioDing
action taken by ODe or more of Sle other directors or officers thereof.
(N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law, II 60, 61; see Teflfley v. Rosenthal, 6 N.Y.2d 204
[189 N.Y.B.2d 158. 160 N.E.2d 463, 467].) Without sueb .tatutory
authorization, an action by an individual director would violate the
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If a private corporation engages in unauthorized business,
either a shareholder of the corporation or the State may enjoin
the doing or continuation of such business by the corporation.
{Corp. Code, § 803.)1
Where a charitable corporation bas failed to comply with
any trust which it has assumed, or where such a corporation
has departed from the general purpose for which it was
formed, the Attorney General is required to institute the proceedings necessary to correct the noncompliance or departure.
(Corp. Code, § 10207.)· No provision has been made for such
a right to be exercised by any other person.
The provisions of the General Corporation Law (Corp.
Code, §§ 1-8999) are made applicable to corporations formed
under the General Nonprofit Corporation Law (Corp. Code,
§§ 9000-10703) except as to matters specifically otherwise provided for (Corp. Code, § 9002). However, the matter of who is
entitled to bring an action for ultra vires acts of the officers
or directors of a charitable corporation is "specifically otherwise provided for" by section 10207 of the Corporations Code.
Therefore, no action may be filed under section 803 of the
Corporations Code with respect to a charitable corporation.
In any event, however, although "shareholder" is defined
to include a member of a nonstock corporation (Corp. Code,
requirement that the affairs of the corporation be managed by the board.
(See Goldman and Kwestel, Director', S:atutorg Action in New Yor17
(1961) 36 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 199, 202.)
ISection 803 of the Corporations Code provides: .. The statement in
the articles of the objects, purposes, powers, and authorized business of
the corporation constitutes, as between the corporation and its directors,
omcers, or shareholders, an authorization to the directors and a limitation upon the actual authority of the representatives of the corporation.
Such limitations may be asserted in a proceeding by a shareholder or
the State, to enjoin the doing or continuation of unauthorized businesa
by the corporation or its omcers, or both, in eases where third parties
have not acquired rights thereby, or to dissolve the corporation, or in •
proceeding by the corporation or by the shareholders suing in a representative suit, against t1le omcers or directors of t1le corporation for
violation of thei~ authority •••• "
·Section 10207 of t1le Corporations Code provides: «« Each such corporation [charitable corporation] sh~lI De subject at all times to exam·
ination by the Attorney General, on behalf of the State, to ascertain the
condition of its affairs and to what extent, if at all, it may faU to
comply with trusts whic!l it has assumed or may depart from the general
purpose for wl1ich it is formed. In case of any such failure or departure
the Attorney General shall institute, in the name of the State, the proceedings necessary to correet the noneompliance or departure.... " (See
also Corp. Code, f 9505.)
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§ 103), no showing has bren made that plaintiffs are members
of defendant college. Ii
Accordingly, plaintiffs lacked capacity to bring the present
action.s
I am of the opinion that we should not disapprove the
holding in George Peppcrcline Foundation v. Pcppcrclinc, 126
Cal.App.2d 154 [271 P.2d 600], in which this court unanimously denied a hearing.
That case was decided in 1954 and has, presumably, been
the law for 10 years. There is no way of telling how many
citizens have followed the law as stated in that case or how
many trial courts have rendered judgments relying thereon.
The Legislature has met on numerous occasions and has not
seen fit to overrule the decision or to change the law as set
forth therein. It could llave done so very simpl~' by amending
II" Member" includes each person signing the articles of a nonstock
corporation and each person admitted to membership therein (Corp.
Code, § 104), and under certain circumstances the persons 011 the con·
trolling board of a nonprofit COl'poration are reg:mletl ns memb~rs (Corp.
Code, § 9603).
sAlthough plaintiffs and the indiyidunl defendantll are designated
"trustees," they are not trustees in the strict. sense, since the title to the
property of the corporation is in the corporation and not in them. (Bainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Cal.2d 423, 428 [2,3J [106 P.2d 423); Brown v.
Memorial Nat. Home Foundation, 162 Cal.App.2d 513, 540 [23] et seq.
[329 P.2d 118, 75 A.L.R.2d 427) [hearing denied by the Supreme Court];
see Rest.2d Trusts (1959) § 16 A, com. a, p. 52.)
Whether or not plaintiffs could maintain this action if they and the
individual defendants were trustees of a charitable trust, rather 'than
members of the controlling board of a charitable corporation, is a question not now before us. There is, however, substantial authority to the
effect that one of several trustees of a charitable trust may maintain an
action against the others to enforce the trust or to compel the redress
of a breach of trust. (See Rest.2d Trusts (1959) § 391, p. 278; 4 Scott,
Trusts (2d ed. 1956) § 891, p. 2757. Cf. O'Hara v. Grand Lodge I.O.G.T.,
218 Cal. 131, 140 [4] [2 P.2d 21].)
In George Pepperdine Foundation v. Pepperdine, 126 Cal.App.2d 154,
161 [3]' [271 P.2d 600], an action by a charitable corporation against
its former directors for damages resulting from "dissipation of its
assets through illegal and speculative transactions and mismanagement
of its affairs" by the defendants during their incumbenei!'s, tIle Distrjrt
Court of Appeal held that the Attorney General was the only person
qualified to maintain an action on behalf of a benevolent, public, charitable trust whose beneficiaries were of an indefinite class of persons,
and that the plaintiff therefore' lacked capacity to bring the action.
Although the language used by the District Court of Appeal refers to
charitable trusts, and not to charitable corporations, the plaintiff there
involved was, in fact, a charitable corporation.
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section 10207 of the Corporations Code, which at that time
vested, and now vests, in the Attorney General the sole authority to bring an action to correct noncompliance with a
trust assumed by a charitable corporation.
In my opinion, in the absence ofa showing that a prior
decision was rendered through (1) corruption or (2) an
obvious mistake, or (3) that conditions have changed making
it inapplicable, the doctrine of stare decisis should be followed by this court so that the District Courts of Appeal,
the trial courts, and lawyers may know what the established
law is. Thus, trial courts will be in a position to render uniform decisions on similar facts, and lawyers will be able to
advise their clients as to the course they should follow. (See
People v. Hines, ante, pp. 164, 182 etseq. [37 Ca1.Rptr. 622,
390 P.2d 398].)
My views on this subject are well expressed by the Honorable Paul R. Hutchinson, President of the Los Angeles
County Bar Association, as follows:
"History records that when tyrants take over governments
the first thing they do is suspend the judicial processes or,
worse, select judges to do their bidding without regard for
established law.
"Uncivilized governments of history were corrupt because
their courts were not dependable. Justice was subject to the
whim of the court. The law was whatever the Court said
was the law. There was no stability-there was no assurance
that the law on which men relied would still be the law when
their rights reached the courts for adjudication.
"The common law set out to end this fickle, unreliable, unstable, capricious and sometimes corrupt system by adopting
a system that called for adherence to established law. Btare
decisis, we called it, which Bouvier defines as meaning, 'To
abide by, or adhere to decided cases. It is a general maxim
that when a point of law has been settled by decision, it
forms a precedent which is not afterwards to be departed
from. . . • Where there have been a series of decisions by the
supreme judicial tribunal of a state, the rule of stare decisis
may usually be regarded as impregnable, except by legislative
act.'
,
"This doctrine was the crowning glory of the common law
and of American jurisprudence. ,By it we became a government of laws, and not of men. 'The law' was the established
law of the people. They provided the soundest basis for de-
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termining the law by which they chose to be governed. If
they thought a law was bad they could change it. But until
they did so, the judge enforced it. Be could not arrogate to
himself the right to change the law and substitute his opinion
for the established law of the people.
,. We prospered under this rule, while less stable governments 1l0undered all around us. Not in any country, at any
time or era, was so much even-handed justice dispensed to
the people. We were the envy of other people in other lands.
They beat upon our gates for admission to our country like
waves upon a dike. They came here by the millions. For they
knew that, in spite of faults, that sometimes appeared, the system was so much bigger than the faults, that through it we
had made one of the great contributions to man's eternal effort
to establish justice among all men.
"Granted that the law should never be wholly inflexible;
granted that changing conditions call for changing interpreta- ,
tions to prevent injustices stemming from an adherence to
form that is so slavish it is blind to the heart and soul of the
legal principle being ruled on, these exceptions should never
justify a court re-writing the organic'laws people have ordained for themselves without great and compelling reasons
that find substantial support among the thinking people of the
Country.••• " (89 Los Angeles Bar Bulletin (July 1964)
321-822.)
". • • I cannot but conclude that there is a strong feeling
arising among thinking lawyers that it is time to speak out to
restore our fundamental system of checks and balances in
government, which concept was one of the greatest contributions our Constitution made to organized governments
throughout the world.
"Under this system the court construes the laws of the
people. In construing them, it should not make Dew and
fundamental laws Dot arising by fair implication from the
laws at hand, for if it does it usurps the law-making power of
the people and their legislative representatives.
"It is ,DO valid answer that a majority of the justices
think that the law they make is good law. We are not, under
the Constitution, Dor caD we permit ourselves to become by
construction or by default, a government by a shifting majority of the members of the Supreme Court.
"Nor should the Court's impatience to achieve reforms
justify its refusal to appJy established law. Roscoe Pound

was perhaps America t8 greatest jurist. His death this month
prompts me to quote from his masterful address on 'The
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice.' It has been re-published by the American Judiciary
Society. Because basic truths never change, it comes as a
surprise to learn that the remarks 80 apt were delivered in
1906. He said:
" 'Public opinion must affect the administration of justice
through the rules by which justice is administered rather than
through the direct administration. All interference with the
uniform and automatic applications of these rules, when actual controversies arise, induces an anti-legal element which
becomes intolerable. . . . We must pay a price for certainty
and uniformity.' I f (39 Los Angeles Bar Bulletin (Aug. 1964)
379-380.)
I would affirm the judgment.
The petition of respondent College and respondent trustees
for a rehearing was denied September 24, 1964. Mosk, J. t did
not participate therein. McComb, J., was of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.

